1. **John Searle’s Denial of Mental Causation**

**Introduction**

John Rogers Searle (b. 1932) is an American philosopher of mind and language. One of his works is Minds, Brains, and Science. In this work, Searle presents the contemporary perspective of the mind-body problem. He argues that we often think of ourselves as conscious, free, mindful, rational agents in a world projected by science as entirely of mindless, meaningless physical particles. But, he asks, how can free human being exist in a mechanical universe. Also how can a mechanical universe contain a conscious human being? Searle regards the problem of the relation of our mind to the rest of the universe as the hardest problem of all. To solve this, he broke away from the old version of the mind-body problem.

**Contemporary Version of the Mind-Body Problem**

The contemporary version of this mind-body problem is: how does the mind relate to the brain? He believes that part of the difficulty is that we continue to use the outdated 17th-century vocabulary for the 20th-century problem. In the old tradition, one could either be a dualist or a monist. So, Searle tries to break away from these old categories of approaching the problem. Apart from vocabulary, there is also a family of problems. From René Descartes, it has been a problem between two apparently completely different kinds of things: mental and physical. The most attempted solution would try to deny or downgrade one, mostly the mental things, and give success to the other, mostly the physical things. For instance, recent materialists such as behaviorism, functionalism, and physicalism tend to deny mental things. Why do they deny mental things? Searle examined the major features of mental phenomena to know why the recent materialists deny or downgrade mental causation.

**Four Features of Mental Phenomena and Causation**

Searle argues that there are four features of mental phenomena which seem impossible to fit into the "scientific" conception of the world as made up of material things. They are consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity, and mental causation.

a. The most important feature is consciousness because, without it, all the other specifically human aspects of existence – language, love, humor, and so on – would be impossible. So, it is a fact that we have conscious mental states and events. But the problem is how to explain that this physical system could have consciousness.

b. Intentionality does not just refer to intention but also to belief, desire, hopes, fears, love, hate, lust, disgust, shame, pride, and so on. This is how to explain the mechanism of intentionality problem, again.

c. Subjectivity or subjective mental states seem difficult to be accommodated within a scientific conception of reality. An example of subjectivity is: I can feel my pains, and you can't feel them. So, it is something individualistic, even though modern philosophy made us think that reality must be objective, that is, accessible to all observers.

d. Mental causation. It is often believed that our thoughts and feelings have certain causal effects on how we behave, that is, on the physical world. E.g., I decide to raise my arm, and – lo and behold – my arm goes up.

The problem is that if our thoughts and feelings are mental states, how can they cause anything physical? Any satisfactory account of the mind-body problem, for Searle, must take these four features into account. He believes that the features of mental phenomena are denied or downgraded because they cannot cause physical events; rather they are caused by the physical events or the brain. So, for Searle, mental phenomenon supervenes on the physical phenomenon.

**Searle's Contention**

“Mental phenomenon, all mental phenomena whether conscious or unconscious, visual or auditory, pains, tickles, itches, thoughts, indeed, all of our mental life, are caused by processes going on in the brain.” He used the causal process of the mental state of pains to demonstrate how brain processes cause mental events or states. Pains, for him, pass through the central nervous system to the brain in order to generate the feeling of pain in the person. The use of surgical anesthesia is to prevent the outside stimulus from having relevant effects on the central nervous system. Searle claims again that: “Pains and other mental phenomena just are features of the brain and perhaps the rest of the central nervous system.” His argument has been that mind or mental phenomena are features of the brain, that is, brains cause minds. The implication of this is the elimination of the human freewill and the subsistence of the human soul or the denial of the human spirit

**Searle's Concept of Causation:**

But how is it that the brain causes minds, and minds do not cause physical states? How can minds be features of the brain and not vice versa? Searle argues that the difficulty is that of a misunderstanding of causation. We always believe that whenever something causes another, there must be two things: one A, which causes the effect B. So, the relationship between brain and mind makes us accept some form of dualism: one material event (brain) and another immaterial event (mind). But, for him, this is a mistake.

For Searle, the solution to this explanation of how the relationship between mind and body could be understood is to get at a more sophisticated concept of causation. He argues that in physics, the distinction between micro-properties (which have features at the level of molecules and atoms as well as at the subatomic level) and macro-properties (physical things like glass or table) is that the behavior of elements at the micro-level causally explains macro-properties. So, for him, the mind and body interact, but they are not two different things (substances) because the minds are just features of the brain. He slipped into epiphenomenalism in trying to solve this problem.

1. **Thomas Aquinas notion of freewill and determinism**

**Introduction**

Freewill's argument contends that rational agents exercise control over their actions and decisions. Determinism, on the contrary, argues that every event, including human cognition, decision, and action, is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences. So, the question is whether human actions are free or determined.

**Idea of Freewill**

In his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas believed that human will is free, which he based on the nature of the human psyche and the existing reality of human nature. In order to understand his idea of free will, it would be good to know his notion of the will. The will, for him, is an appetite or power of the soul which inclines us toward something. This appetitive power makes us desire things that we strive to unite ourselves with or acquire. But the activity of this power is consequent upon knowledge, which itself is the attainment of a new form in an immaterial way. The appetite follows this knowledge.

**Two Kinds of Knowledge**

According to Aquinas, two kinds of knowledge, sense and intellect, correspond to two kinds of appetites: sensual and intellectual appetites. Sensual appetite follows sense knowledge, and this sense knowledge is the apprehension of the forms of things in their particularity. Similarly, intellectual knowledge, which is the apprehension of the universal forms, goes with the intellectual appetite. In the human person, the intellect moves logically from premise to conclusion. In this case, the consequent appetite is rational, and it is called the will, which is the power by which we desire the universal without being bound by particular or material things.

The object of both appetites is proportional to the kind of knowledge appropriate to each. All appetites tend towards good in some manner, and the manner by which each tends towards the good is determined by the kind of form it has before it, i.e., that is the kind of knowledge it has. Hence, sense appetite tends toward sensible, particular goods, while the will tends toward universal goodness. Though St. Thomas believed that the will is free, he also believed in the notion of necessity, which cannot be otherwise. We need to investigate whether his necessity, which has the elements of determinism, can negate human free will.

**Necessity**

It is good to understand how this necessity that has the implication of determinism does not vitiate human freewill. Aquinas explained his idea of necessity from the four causes of Aristotle, which he divided into two groups, namely:

a. Two internal causes (or necessity) as material and formal causes;

b. Two external causes (or necessity) as efficient and final causes.

**Internal Necessity**

Internal necessity refers to natural necessity. For instance, in corporeal things, the principle of matter and form are the natural causes of the thing. That a tree grows and dies is a natural necessity. Since the will is not material, it has no necessity that corresponds to this kind of cause. But since the will is considered a nature of the principle of action, it has natural necessity following upon its nature, which is inclined toward universal goodness. The will of necessity follows upon reason because to will anything, that thing must first be known. Since the will is a power distinct from the intellect, it has, of necessity, a distinct object: the universal good as opposed to universal truth.

**External Necessity**

In the order of efficient causality, something is moved necessarily by an exterior agent contrary to its natural inclination. Aquinas gave an example of a rock lifted upward, and this rock tends to move downward because of what it is. To move it upward is to oppose its natural inclination. However, the will is moved by an exterior agent, which is how it was created. So, this exterior cause is not opposed to its inclination because it is the cause of its nature. The necessity, called coercion, is totally repugnant to the will. While the will has no necessity in the order of efficient causality, it is not so in the final causality. Since the will is an appetite, it is a faculty by which we are inclined towards something. The end of the will, which is the universal goodness, is given to it by its nature. Coercion or force is an efficient necessity against the will. For example, throwing one in a room in which one does not want to be. It is against one's will. Coercion cannot move the will because it would be (forced to be) inclined to something that it is not inclined to, hence a contradiction. What, then, is the uncoerced will?

**The Notion of Voluntary Action**

It follows from the will as a free act. This voluntary includes those things that cannot be otherwise, that is, necessity according to nature and finality. While the will and its end cannot be altered, its actions are still the products of the will itself. Hence, the acts are called voluntary. On the contrary, the necessities are not called voluntary because they are not acts of the will; rather, they are its principle of operation. How, then, is one said to be free to act?

**Freedom to Act**

Freedom pertains to the exercise or non-exercise of the will and the act of the will regarding particular ends as means to the general end. The will of necessity wills universal goodness as its end and elicits its act by means of reason. This tendency is voluntary to the will. But Aquinas did not consider this general tendency toward the good as free because it is determined necessarily. The knowledge of this Good is attainable only in the beatific vision after death. Hence, we will the Good voluntarily but not freely. In this present life, no one object can be considered by our will as totally good; hence, it cannot move the will necessarily to will it in particular. The will must necessarily be moved by the good, but no one thing can so exhaust goodness that the will is moved to it by necessity. Since there is no particular means necessary for the attainment of goodness or happiness, there is freedom of the will. The will might not choose any particular means to attain its end because it is not bound by necessity.

1. **Substance and Accidents**

**Introduction**

**Ten Categories**

Aristotle developed a theory of ten categories comprising substance and nine accidents. The term category is derived from the Greek word "kategoriai," meaning "predicates." It represents the way we talk about being. The nine accidents are quality, quantity, relation, location, time, position, habit, action, and passion. For Aristotle, these accidents are properties that are predicated on the substance. Substance literally means that which "stands under" or "remains under" a thing's appearance as the permanent and basic element sustaining accidents.

**Etymology of Substance**

Etymologically, "substance" is from the Latin word "substancia," meaning that which "stands under" (sub stare). The Latin substancia was used to translate the Greek term "ousia," an abstract noun for being. But Martin Heidegger did not agree that substancia translates ousia. He argues that such a claim was the major cause of the oblivion or forgetfulness of being among metaphysicians.

**Division of Substance**

Aristotle taught that there are three kinds of substances: perishable sensible substance, eternal sensible substance, and unmovable (non-sensible) substance. For him, the former two kinds of substance are the subject of physics; the third kind belongs to another science. The ones that belong to physics are subject to change, but the other one is not. Substance admits accidents as its properties, and they are not substances in themselves. Aristotle has two types of substances and two types of properties. The two types of substances are primary and secondary substances. The individual is a primary substance, while the universal is a secondary substance. For example, Socrates is a primary substance, while the universal, man, is a secondary substance.

**Primary Substance**

For something to qualify as a primary substance, it must possess both characteristics of not said-of and not present-in. But for something to qualify as a universal or an accident, it needs only to possess at least one of those characteristics. For instance, let us take Socrates as a primary substance. The statement thus: Socrates is a man. Here Socrates is not said-of man and not present-in man. So, Socrates is a primary substance. How, then, did Aristotle explain accidents?

**Secondary/Universal Substance**

Secondary substance, also known as universal substance, refers to the essence of a species or the genus of an individual, such as man. A secondary substance is said-of a subject but it is not present-in that subject as a secondary substance. For example, Y is not in a subject & Y is said-of a subject, = Y is a substance universal.

**Said-Of and Present-In**

Cohen divided Aristotle's two fundamental ontological relations, "Said-of," meaning predicated of something, and "Present-in," meaning being present in something, into fourfold terms in order to explain how substance differs from accidents and how accidents are regarded as the properties of substance. The fourfold divisions are said-of, present-in, not said-of, and not present-in. Accidents are said-of something and are present-in something, but substance, especially primary substance, is not said-of anything, and it is not present-in something.

**Accidents**

The term "accident" is derived from the Greek word "symbebekos," whose plural is "symbebekuta" (accidents), which means "going along with" or "occurring with" something else. An accident cannot exist independently like substance but must inhere in substance. Aristotle has two meanings of accident, that is:

a. That which is attached to a subject and exists not by virtue of the nature of the subject but by something else. This accident cannot be eternal.

b. That which is attached to something in virtue of itself but is not in the essence of that thing. According to Aristotle, this type of accident may be eternal.

Returning to the fourfold division, Cohen gives an analysis of accident in Aristotle as that which is not said-of but is present-in something as a particular that is not substance, but an accident. Contemporary metaphysicians call such entities tropes, meaning that they are abstract particulars. For example, we take the statement: Socrates is white. The white here refers to a particular accident which is the white of Socrates. Another person, like Plato, may be white, but his own white is particular to him just the same way the white of Socrates is particular to Socrates. This particular white that inheres in an individual substance is a non-substance particular.

**Types of Accidents**

In Aristotle, just like in substance, the two types of accidents or properties are the individual accident or individual non-substance and the secondary accident or universal non-substance. For instance, this white is an individual non-substance, while whiteness is a universal non-substance. Hence, not every individual is a substance.

**Essential and Accidental Predications**

Cohen further uses the two fundamental ontological relations, said-of and present-in, to distinguish between an essential or proper predicate and a contingent predicate. This is to show clearly that something about a substance, which is not the substance itself, could be essential to it and not just a mere accident. For instance, tropes differ from the non-substance universal because tropes could be traced to a particular substance, but non-substance universal does not inhere in a particular substance. An example of non-substance universal is whiteness or white, not this white. So, this white (trope) is “present-in” Socrates; hence, this white is an accidental or contingent predication of Socrates. On the essential predication, man is “said-of” Socrates; hence, man is an essential predication of Socrates. The said-of and present-in correspond to the notions of essential and accidental predications respectively.

**Summary Sketch of Substance and Accidents**

The fourfold division of Aristotle's ontology of the Categories could be summarized below.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Primary substance**  Not said-of a subject  Not present-in a subject  “This man,” “This horse” | **Primary accidence**  Not said-of a subject  Present-in a subject  “This knowledge of grammar,” “This white" |
| **Secondary substance**  Said-of a subject  Not present-in a subject  “Man,” “horse,” “animal” | **Secondary accidence**  Said-of a subject  Present-in a subject  “Knowledge,” “white” |

Since the material substance has parts, the question is whether the parts are substances themselves, or can substance exist if the parts are removed?

**Bundle Theory**

The bundle theory's problem, developed in modern era, is rooted in the idea of ontological dependence of qualities on the substance. It is argued that without substance the qualities would not exist. But the question arose whether, without qualities, would substance exist. Without the body parts of Socrates, would there be Socrates? Or, when an orange's yellowness or circular shape is removed, would there be orange as a substance? Invariably, it seems that in this physical world, without the qualities, the substance itself would not exist. But does this mean that substance is itself ontologically dependent on the qualities as well? The bundle theorists, such as David Hume, argue that substance is nothing other than a bundle or collection of properties. This problem seems to have been fanned by the conception of substance as a substratum or a bare particular upon which qualities ontologically depend for their existence. This theory of substratum was proposed by John Locke. Some philosophers like George Berkeley criticized Locke for this theory saying that thesubstractum as an individual cannot be perceived

**Against the bundle theory**

The bundle theory was countered by Jonathan Lowel. He argued that the bundle theory is a category mistake. This is because the quality of the substance belonds to different categories. According to Lowe, the bundle theory mistakenly attributes to properties the role of constituting independent entities, which they cannot fulfill. Hence, the bundle theory is presenting an unanswerable question

A jointer to the bundle theory is the theory of the indicernability of identical by Liebniz. That irrespective of their similarities, they are still distinct.

**Summarized part**

**Question 1**

John Rogers Searle, an American philosopher of mind and language, presents the contemporary perspective of the mind-body problem. He argues that we often think of ourselves as conscious, free, mindful, rational agents in a world projected by science as entirely of mindless, meaningless physical particles. However, he questions how a mechanical universe can contain a conscious human being. Searle regards the problem of the relation of our mind to the rest of the universe as the hardest problem of all.

The contemporary version of the mind-body problem is: how does the mind relate to the brain. Searle believes that part of the difficulty is that we continue to use outdated 17th-century vocabulary for the 20th-century problem. In the old tradition, one could either be a dualist or a monist. Searle tries to break away from these old categories of approaching the problem.

There are four features of mental phenomena which seem impossible to fit into the "scientific" conception of the world as made up of material things: consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity, and mental causation. The most important feature is consciousness because without it, all the other specifically human aspects of existence – language, love, humor, and so on – would be impossible.

Intentionality refers to belief, desire, hopes, fears, love, hate, lust, disgust, shame, pride, and more. Subjectivity or subjective mental states seem difficult to be accommodated within a scientific conception of reality. For Searle, any satisfactory account of the mind-body problem must take these four features into account. He believes that the features of mental phenomena are denied or downgraded because they cannot cause physical events; rather, they are caused by the physical events or the brain.

Searle's contention is that all mental phenomena, whether conscious or unconscious, visual or auditory, pains, tickles, itches, thoughts, and all of our mental life, are caused by processes going on in the brain. He uses the causal process of the mental state of pains to demonstrate how brain processes cause mental events or states.

Searle's concept of causation is a more sophisticated approach to understanding the relationship between mind and body. He argues that in physics, the distinction between micro-properties (which have features at the level of molecules and atoms as well as at the subatomic level) and macro-properties (physical things like glass or table) is that the behavior of elements at the micro-level causally explains macro-properties.

For Searle, the mind and body interact, but they are not two different things (substances) because the minds are just features of the brain. He slipped into epiphenomenalism in trying to solve this problem.

**Question 2**

Thomas Aquinas' notion of freewill and determinism is based on the idea that rational agents exercise control over their actions and decisions. Aquinas believed that human will is free, based on the nature of the human psyche and existing reality of human nature. He identified two kinds of knowledge: sense and intellect, which correspond to two kinds of appetites: sensual and intellectual. Sensual appetite follows sense knowledge, which is the apprehension of the forms of things in their particularity, while intellectual knowledge, which is the apprehension of the universal forms, goes with the intellectual appetite.

The object of both appetites is proportional to the kind of knowledge appropriate to each. All appetites tend towards good in some manner, and the manner by which each tends towards the good is determined by the kind of form it has before it, i.e., that is the kind of knowledge it has. Hence, sense appetite tends toward sensible, particular goods, while the will tends toward universal goodness.

Aquinas explained his idea of necessity from the four causes of Aristotle, which he divided into two groups: internal (internal necessity) as material and formal causes; and external (external necessity) as efficient and final causes. Internal necessity refers to natural necessity, such as the principle of matter and form in corporeal things. The will of necessity follows upon reason because to will anything, that thing must first be known. Since the will is a power distinct from the intellect, it has, of necessity, a distinct object: the universal good as opposed to universal truth.

External necessity is repugnant to the will, as it is the cause of its nature. In the order of efficient causality, something is moved necessarily by an exterior agent contrary to its natural inclination. However, the will is not opposed to its inclination because it is the cause of its nature. Coercion or force is an efficient necessity against the will, as it would be (forced to be) inclined to something that it is not inclined to, hence a contradiction.

The notion of voluntary action follows from the will as a free act, including those things that cannot be otherwise, that is, necessity according to nature and finality. While the will and its end cannot be altered, its actions are still the products of the will itself. On the contrary, the necessities are not called voluntary because they are not acts of the will; rather, they are its principle of operation.

Freedom pertains to the exercise or non-exercise of the will and the act of the will regarding particular ends as means to the general end. The will of necessity wills universal goodness as its end and elicits its act by means of reason. This tendency is voluntary to the will, but Aquinas did not consider this general tendency toward the good as free because it is determined necessarily. In this present life, no one object can be considered by our will as totally good, hence, it cannot move the will necessarily to will it in particular. The will must necessarily be moved by the good, but no one thing can so exhaust goodness that the will is moved to it by necessity. Thus, there is freedom of the will, as the will might not choose any particular means to attain its end because it is not bound by necessity.

Quesition 3

Aristotle's theory of ten categories, including substance and nine accidents, is derived from the Greek word "kategoriai," meaning "predicates." The nine accidents are quality, quantity, relation, location, time, position, habit, action, and passion. Substance is the permanent and basic element sustaining accidents, while accidents are properties predicated on the substance.

Aristotle divided substances into three kinds: perishable sensible substance, eternal sensible substance, and unmovable (non-sensible) substance. The former two kinds are the subject of physics, while the third belongs to another science. Substance admits accidents as its properties, and they are not substances in themselves. There are two types of substances and two types of properties: primary and secondary substances.

Primary substances must possess both characteristics of not said-of and not present-in, while secondary substances, also known as universal substance, refer to the essence of a species or the genus of an individual, such as man. Cohen divided Aristotle's two fundamental ontological relations, "Said-of," meaning predicated of something, and "Present-in," meaning being present in something, into fourfold terms to explain how substance differs from accidents and how accidents are regarded as the properties of substance.

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In Aristotle, the two types of accidents or properties are the individual accident or individual non-substance and the secondary accident or universal non-substance. For instance, this white is an individual non-substance, while whiteness is a universal non-substance. Hence, not every individual is a substance.

Cohen further uses the two fundamental ontological relations, said-of and present-in, to distinguish between essential or proper predicates and a contingent predicate. This is to show clearly that something about a substance, which is not the substance itself, could be essential to it and not just a mere accident.

The bundle theory, developed in the modern era, is rooted in the idea of ontological dependence of qualities on the substance. It is argued that without substance the qualities would not exist. However, the question arose whether, without qualities, would substance exist. Bundle theorists argue that substance is nothing other than a bundle or collection of properties, which seems to have been fanned by the conception of substance as a substratum or bare particular upon which qualities ontologically depend for their existence.

Against the bundle theory, Jonathan Lowel argued that the bundle theory is a category mistake, as the quality of the substance belonds to different categories. According to Lowel, the bundle theory mistakenly attributes the role of constituting independent entities, which they cannot fulfill. Hence, the bundle theory presents an unanswerable question.

A jointer to the bundle theory is the theory of the indicernability of identical by-products. The bundle theory is based on the idea that the substance is a product of the parts of the subject, and the indicernability of identical by-products is based on the idea that the substance is a product of the parts of the subject.